Oklahoma Law Review
Volume 50

Number 4

1-1-1997

Constitutional Law: Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr
and O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake--The Extension of
First Amendment Protection to Independent Contractors--The
Garbage Man Can Now Talk Trash!
Brent C. Eckersley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brent C. Eckersley, Constitutional Law: Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr and O'Hare Truck
Service v. City of Northlake--The Extension of First Amendment Protection to Independent Contractors-The Garbage Man Can Now Talk Trash!, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 557 (1997),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss4/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

NOTES
Constitutional Law: Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr and O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake
The Extension of First Amendment Protection to Independent Contractors - The Garbage Man Can Now Talk
Trash!
L Introduction
Peter public employee' and Ira independent contractor,2 both Republicans, went
to lunch to discuss the renewal of a city service contract. Ira's service had been
outstanding so there was no reason for the city not to renew the contract. As lunch
continued, they began speaking negatively about the new mayor, a Democrat. A
devoted colleague of the mayor overheard their comments and quickly reported it
to the mayor. Realizing that these Republicans opposed his policies, the mayor
discharged Peter and did not renew Ira's contract. Prior to June 1996, Ira would
have no recourse because his status as an independent contractor did not grant him
First Amendment protection for either political affiliation or speech. Peter's status
as a public employee, on the other hand, allowed him to seek a remedy. He had
two lines of United States Supreme Court precedents protecting his First
Amendment rights.
The first line of cases protecting Peter from patronage dismissal began in 1976.
In the landmark decision of Elrod v. Bums,4 the United States Supreme Court held
that discharging a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential public employee for reasons
of political patronage or party affiliation violated the employee's rights of
association and expression! In 1980, the Court reaffirmed this holding in Branti

1. In this comment, "public employee" refers to government employees whom the government may
discharge for any reason that does not violate the Constitution.
2. An independent contractor is "one who, in exercising an independent employment, contracts to
do certain work according to his or her own methods, without being subject to the control of the
employer, except as to the product or result of the work." 41 AM. JuR. 21 Independent Contractors§
1 (1995); BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 530 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Patronage generally means "the allocation of discretionary favors of government in exchange for
political support." MARTIN TOLCHiN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, To THE VICrOR: POLrIICAL PATRONAGE FROM
THE CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHrrE HOUSE 55 (1971); see also Richard L. Hasen, Note, An Enriched
Economic Model of Political Patronage and Campaign Contributions: Reformulating Supreme Court
Jurisprudence, 14 CARDOZA L. REV. 1311, 1311 (1993) (quoting TOLCHIN & TOLcHIN, supra); Louis
Cammarosano, Note, Application of the FirstAmendment to PoliticalPatronageEmployment Decisions,
58 FORDiHAM L. REv. 101, 101 (1989) (quoting TOLCHIN & TOLC-IN, supra).
4. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
5. See id. at 372-73.
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v. Finkel.6 The Court completed the trilogy in 1990 with Rutan v. Republican Party
of Illinois,7 in which the Court held that patronage hiring and transfers for reasons
of political patronage or party affiliation violated an employee's First Amendment
rights With this trilogy of cases, the Court struck down an important part of the
patronage system.
The second line of cases protecting Peter's free speech rights began with
Pickeringv. Board of Education9 in 1968. In Pickering,the United States Supreme
Court articulated an interest balancing test for determining when an employer may
dismiss a public employee for speaking on matters of public concern." Fifteen
years later, in Connick v. Myers," the Court refined the test and ruled that it only
applied when the employee's speech touched on matters of public concern." In
1987, in Rankin v. McPherson,3 the United States Supreme Court finished the
freedom of expression trilogy protecting public employee First Amendment rights
by adding to the balancing test the confidential or policymaking status of an
employee. 4 This additional trilogy of First Amendment cases provided public
employees even greater protection.
Through all these cases, however, the Court did not extend the First Amendment
protection given public employees to independent contractors. These holdings
preserved the most valued element of the patronage system, the distribution of
government contracts as a reward for political support. Under these decisions, the
First Amendment rights of parties depended on whether they worked for the
government as public employees or as independent contractors.
Today, however, there is a Court willing to extend First Amendment protection
to independent contractors. In June 1996, the United States Supreme Court, in
O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake5 and Board of County Commissioners
v. Umbehr 6 took the first steps toward extending the same First Amendment rights
enjoyed by public employees to independent contractors. Although these decisions
did not address hiring practices, they did 6rase the distinction between public
employees and independent contractors.
This note first reviews the history of the Court's decisions establishing
constitutional limitations in dismissing public employees and the lack of limitations
in dismissing independent contractors. Included is a comparison between the public

6. 445 U.S. 507, 521 (1980).
7. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).

8. See id.
at 79. Th First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States expressly provides
that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, -or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CoNsT.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

amend. I.
391 U.S. 563 (.1968).
See id.at 573.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
See id. at 147.
483 U.S. 378 (1987).
See id. at 385.
116 S.Ct. 2353 (1996).
116 S.Ct. 2342 (1996).
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employee and independent contractor cases. Second, this note reviews and analyzes
the opinions of O'Hareand Umbehr in which the Court finally recognized the need
to extend First Amendment protection to independent contractors. Finally, this note
addresses the possible ramifications of extending First Amendment protection to
independent contractors.
II. History
A. Public Employees
1. Supreme Court PatronageDecisions
The first United States Supreme Court decision on patronage arose out of a
challenge to the patronage practices of the Cook County Sheriffs office. In Elrod
v. Burns,7 a newly elected Democratic sheriff fired various Republican employees
in the sheriffs office to make room for Democratic Party supporters. 8 Had the
Republican employees pledged political allegiance to the Democratic Party,
contributed to the Democratic Party, or promised to work for the election of
Democratic candidates, they could have kept their jobs. The employees sued,
alleging that the sheriff violated their First Amendment rights of speech and
association by discharging them solely because they were not affiliated with or
sponsored by the Democratic Party." The defendants argued that patronage
dismissals served three important governmental interests: (1) the interest in effective
and efficient government; (2) the need for loyal employees to carry out the
programs of an elected administration; and (3) the preservation of strong and broadbased political parties. 2'
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-three decision, but without a
majority opinion,' held that the discharges were impermissible.' The Court
determined that the discharges amounted to the denial of a benefit - government
employment - based upon an unconstitutional condition, the coercion of an
individual's freedom of associationu Consequently, the discharges indirectly
produced a result that the government was forbidden to produce directly.' The

17. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
18. See id.at 349-50.
19. See id. at 355.

20. See id at 350.
21. See id. at 364-68.
22. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, which Justices White and Marshall joined. See id.

at 349. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stewart's separate concurring opinion.. See id. at 374 (Stewart,
J., concurring). Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger filed dissenting opinions. See id. at 375-76
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell's dissent, as did the Chief Justice.
Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
23. See id. at 373.
24. See id. at 359.
25. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the plurality relied upon the Court's prior opinions
invalidating requirements that condition public employment upon political belief. For example, the
signature of a loyalty oath or nonmembership in the Communist Party is an invalid requirement for
public employment. See id. at 357-58 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967);

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:557

plurality opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, 7 found that the discharges
implicated two First Amendment interests: (1) the government employee's interest

in freely expressing political beliefs and in freely associating with others to advance
those beliefs;' and (2) the societal interest in free and open discussion of public
affairs.' While acknowledging these interests' importance, the Court created an

exception allowing patronage dismissals for public positions that inherently involved
"policymaking" duties;" dismissal of policymaking officials serves the vital
governmental interest of facilitating the implementation of a new administration's
policies." Commentators3' and the Court itself' have read the exception to
include confidential employees.

After Elrod, the constitutionality of patronage dismissals turned on whether the
employer could classify the employee's position as confidential or policymaking. If

so, successful employers could then invoke the exception forbidding dismissals
based on political affiliation. The United States Supreme Court later tightened this

exception and outlined a test for determining an employee's policymaker status in
Brand v. Finkel.33
In Brand, two Republican assistant public defenders brought suit after the newly

elected Democratic public defender dismissed them.3 Focusing on the essentiality
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191
(1952)).
26. See supra note 22.
27. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355-56.
28. See id. at 356-57.
29. See id.at 359-60. William Luneburg noted that:
The restrictions that have been imposed on patronage practices under Elrod and its
progeny help assure that, when intragovemmental debate does occur, there may be a
greater diversity of views expressed than would be the case if various tests of political
loyalty could be imposed in structuring'the composition of the public workforce. The
"policymaking" position exception to Elrod,however, should be very narrowly limited to
control its erosion of that diversity within the higher levels of policy debate where such
diversity may be essential to a deliberative process capable of taking account of all
significant points of view.
William V. Luneburg, Chic Republicanism, the FirstAmendment, and Executive Branch Policymaking,
43 ADMIN. L. REV.367, 391 (1991).
30. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367 (stating that patronage dismissals of policymakers ensures that
representative government will not be undercut by tactics obstructing policies of new administration).
31. See Note, Branti v. Finkel: Spoiling the Spoils System, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 871, 878 (1981)
(noting that nonconfidential distinction supplanted plurality analysis); Note, Politics and the Non-Civil
Service Public Employee: A CategoricalApproach to FirstAmendment Protection, 85 CoLUM. L. Rev.
558, 561-62 (1985) (observing that, after Elrod, public employees cannot be fired solely for political
affiliation).
32. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1980).
33. 445 U.S. 507 (19,80).
34. See id,
at 508. The plaintiffs, Finkel and Tabakman, held positions as assistant public defenders
in Rockland County, New York. See id. When the Rockland County Legislature appointed Branti, a
Democrat, as Rockland County Public Defender, he issued termination notices to six of the nine
assistants in his office. See i. at 509. The plaintiffs were among the six receiving such a notice. See
id.Evidence suggested that the only reason for the plaintiffs' dismissals was that they were not
recommended by the Democratic caucus because they were not Democrats. See id.at 510 n.5.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss4/5

1997]

NOTES

of party membership to a position in determining whether the law justified the
patronage dismissal, the Court held that a court must ask "whether the hiring
authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the
effective performance of the public office involved."35 Although this reformulation
established a less definitive standard, it did not represent an abandonment of the
approach in Elrod. The Court failed, however, to announce any alternatives for
determining when political affiliation might be an "appropriate requirement" for
public employment under its revised test. 7 As a result, some courts regarded

Brant! as more semantic than substantive," while other courts, often with
inconsistent results,39 struggled in determining whether the prohibition against
patronage firing covered some governmental jobs.
In addition to the policymaking exception, the lower courts now struggled over

the question of whether the constitutional prohibition against firing workers because
of their political affiliations also applied to hiring and other adverse personnel
actions other than firing.' Some courts treated demotion as indistinguishable from
dismissal.4'
The United States Supreme Court completed the trilogy of patronage cases when
it confronted these issues in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois.42 In Rutan,
former and present low-level public employees and an employment applicant

35. Id. at 518. The Court noted that some positions "may be appropriately considered political even
though [they are] neither confidential nor policymaking in character," but "party affiliation is not
necessarily relevant to every policymaking or confidential position." ld.
36. Justice Powell criticized the revised standard as "framed in vague and sweeping language certain
at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting).
to create vast uncertainty." Id.
37. Rather than articulating standards for determining when political affiliation might be considered
a legitimate employment consideration, the Court merely expressed its conclusion as to the appropriateness of requiring political affiliation for three positions: precinct watcher, speech writer for a
state governor, and head football coach of a state university. See id at 517-18.
38. Many courts, while quoting language from Brand, have applied the nonconfidential,
nonpolicymaking test set forth in Elrod. See, e.g., Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1169-70 (7th Cir.
1981).
39. For example, a deputy sheriff may be fired for political reasons in the Seventh Circuit, but not
in the Fourth Circuit. Compare Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1991) (discharged deputies
were not protected from patronage firings), with Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984)
(discharge of deputies solely because of political party affiliation is not justified). For a survey of
decisions about whether positions are policymaking under Elrod as well as a discussion of the
inconsistency and unpredictability of the cases, see Susan Lorde Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions:
A Government Official's Guide to PatronageDismissals,39 AM. U. L. REV. 11 (1989).
40. The lower courts developed a variety of tests, including whether ajob into which an individual
was transferred was "unreasonably inferior" to his previous position, see, e.g., Agosto-de-Feliciano v.
Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1218-19 (lst. Cir. 1989), and whether the adverse employment action was
"the substantial equivalent of dismissal," see, e.g., Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 623-24 (4th
Cir. 1980).
41. See, e.g., Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 732 (3rd Cir. 1987) (stating that police officers could
not be demoted for exercising Frst Amendment rights); Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d
236, 238 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc) (involving the demotion of two regional directors of Puerto Rico
Urban Development and Housing Corporation).
42. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
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challenged the hiring, promotion, transfer, and recall practices of the Republican

Party and the Governor's office of Illinois! 3 In a five-to-four decision," the
United States Supreme Court held that patronage hiring, and failures for political
reasons to promote, transfer, and recall after layoff, violated the First
Amendment.4' The defendants tried to distinguish hiring from firing on the ground

that failure to hire placed a less severe burden upon the disappointed job applicant's
rights than did the loss of a job. Finding that these practices placed impermissible
burdens on free speech and association, the majority rejected the defendants'
argument."
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Scalia raised several broad policy objections
to the constitutional ban on patronage.47 He argued that patronage had played an

important historical role in increasing political participation, democratizing politics,
and strengthening the American system of political parties.48 Indeed, the mere
existence of a tradition of political patronage in American history, Scalia argued,
was grounds enough to find that the Constitution allowed the practice.49 Scalia also
argued that the Couit's decision would effectively open the floodgates of litigation.
He believed that transforming every government employment decision adversely
affecting a political opponent into a constitutional issue would require federal courts
to review virtually every adverse employment decision.'

43. See id. at 65-66. On November 12, 1980, Governor Thompson issued an executive order that
imposed a hiring freeze on positions within his administration subject to his control; the only way hiring
took place thereafter was to obtain a waiver of the freeze as to a particular hiring decision. The
governor's political patrcnage staff made decisions about waivers upon recommendations from local
Republican party officials. The political patronage staff looked at whether the applicant voted in
Republican primaries in past elections years, whether the applicant had provided financial or other
support to the Republican Party and its candidates, whether the applicant had promised to join and work
for the Republican Party in the future, and whether the applicant had the support of Republican party
officials at state or local levels. See id. For a description of how this patronage system operated, see
David K. Hamilton, The Staffing Function in Illinois State Government after Rutan, 53 PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 381, 381-82 (1993).
44. Justices White, lackmun, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan in the majority opinion.
See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, O'Conner, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
See id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. See i. at 79.
46. See id. at 77-79.
47. Unlike Justice Powell in Elrod and Brand, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's overall mode
of analysis. Scalia argued that the Court must interpret the existence of patronage at the founding of the
republic to mean that the First Amendment did not prohibit patronage. See id. at 92-104 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, the restriction of the First Amendment rights of public employees does not
require strict scrutiny. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. See i. at 104-08.
49. See id. at 108. Justice Scalia subscribes to the originalist school of constitutional interpretation.
Originalists maintain that the Court should not read into the Constitution rights that did not clearly exist
at the time of the Constitution's drafting. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
50. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 115.
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2. Supreme Court Free Speech Decisions
In a separate line of decisions beginning in 1968, the Supreme Court articulated
the test for determining whether the government has unconstitutionally dismissed
a public employee in retaliation for any type of expression. In Pickering v. Board
of Education,5' a school teacher sued for reinstatement after the school board fired
him for sending a letter critical of school board policy to a local newspaper.' In
Justice Marshall's majority opinion, the Court held that the school board could not
deprive Pickering, the teacher, of his right as a citizen to comment on matters of
public concern.' The Court did not focus exclusively on the relative authority
associated with the employee's position as it had in Elrod and Branti, but rather
sought "to arrive at a balance between the interest of the [employee], as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."' The Court refused to enunciate a "general standard" by which it
should judge the conflicts in the future because of the infinite variety of factual
circumstances in which such conflicts might arise.55 The Court did, however, note
the factors that went into its analysis of the case at bar.56
Fifteen years later, in Connick v. Myers,' the Supreme Court added two
refinements to the balancing test.58 First, before applying the Pickering balancing
test, the Court must determine whether the employee's speech touches on "a matter
of public concern."59 In making this determination, a court must look to "the
'
content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."
When the expression does not satisfy this initial inquiry, the First Amendment does
not offer protection against the challenged personnel decision."' If the speech at
issue satisfies the threshold inquiry, the district court should then apply the second
prong of the analysis, carefully balancing the government's interests against the

51. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
52. See id. at 564.

at 568.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 568.
55. See id. at 569.
56. Among the factors that appeared to weigh heavily in the result were the nature of the working
relationship between the teacher and the school board, and the public significance of the letter's content.
See id. at 569-72.
57. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Connick, an assistant district attorney in New Orleans, circulated a
questionnaire to her co-workers concerning pressure to campaign on behalf of candidates supported by
the district attorney, office morale and the trustworthiness of supervisors. See id. at 140-41.
58. The Court had considered the Pickeringbalancing test on two previous occasions. See Givhan
v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979) (expanding scope of protection to
include private expression regarding issues of public concern); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977) (finding that no cause of action exists where an employee would have been
dismissed regardless of protected expression).
59. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
60. Id. at 147-48.
61. See id. at 146.
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employee's First Amendment right to speak.' Relevant factors to consider include
the particular need for close working relationships, the disruptiveness of the speech,
and the extent to which the speech involves matters of public concern.' In
Connick, finding that the statement in question "touched upon matters of public
concern in only a most limited sense," the Court permitted the public employer to
justify the dismissad by showing that he had "reasonably believed" that the
expression would cause disruption." The Court cautioned, however, that "a
stronger showing [of disruption] may be necessary if the employee's speech more
substantially involved matters of public concern."'
The Court further refined the Pickeringbalancing test in Rankin v. McPherson.'
In Rankin, a deputy constable spoke on a matter of public concern when she
remarked, in response to learning of an assassination attempt on President Reagan,
"[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him."'7 The Court held that the speech
was of public concern, applied the Pickering balancing test, and still resolved the
balance in favor of the deputy.' In balancing the employee's speech interest against
the state's efficiency interest, the Court added the confidential or policymaking
status of an employee as another factor weighing in the balance of the Pickering
test.' The Court observed that where the "employee serves no confidential,
policymaking, or public contact role, the danger to the agency's successful
functioning from that employee's private speech is minimal."7 Thus, the more the
employee's job requires confidentiality, policymaking, or public contact, the greater
the state's interest in firing her for expression that offends her employer.'
B. Independent Contractors:A Comparison With Public Employee Decisions
Not long after the Branti decision, disappointed independent contractors began
seeking the same First Amendment protection from patronage that public employees
enjoyed. The first significant case to address the constitutional rights of patronage
practices affecting independent contractors was Sweeney v. Bond.' In Sweeney,
former fee agents for the Missouri Department of Revenue brought suit against the
new Republican Governor and the Director of the Department, alleging that the
governor and director dismissed them from their positions solely because of their

62. See id at 150.
63. See id at 151-54.
64. Id at 154. The trial court had required a showing of actual disruption. See id. at 142.
65. Id at 152; see also The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 164-71 (1983)
(stating that Connick "created a doctrinal conflict," and the "result will be conflict among the circuits and

confusion among public employees.").
66. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
67. l at381, 386-87.
68. See id at 388-89, 392.
69. See id at 390-91.
70. Id
71. See id The Court found a reduced state interest because the employee, although bearing the title
of "deputy constable," performed the duties of a data entry clerk. See id. at 380-81.
72. 669 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1982).
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political affiliation." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
determined that the fee agents were not state employees and instead found them to
be independent contractors.'
The Sweeney court concluded that the holdings in Elrod and Branti were limited
5
specifically to the dismissal of public employees for partisan reasons. Relying
solely on the statements in Elrod" limiting those decisions to the issue of
discharged public employees, the court declined to extend First Amendment
protection to independent contractors.' The court then determined that political
affiliation was an appropriate requirement for effective performance, thus bringing
the fee agents within the Brand exception.78 Thus, in dismissing any potential
application of Elrod and Branti, the circuit court never reached the merits of the
case, nor did it address any competing interest between individual rights of speech
and association and overriding governmental concerns. Classifying the employees
as independent contractors was apparently enough to distinguish Elrod and Branti
and dismiss the validity of any constitutional claim.
Shortly after the Sweeney decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its position. In Fox & Co. v. Schoemehl,' the plaintiff
public accounting firm brought suit against the new mayor of St. Louis alleging that
the mayor had replaced them as auditors for the St. Louis Board of Education solely
because they opposed the mayor in the recent election.' The court held that the
accounting firm hired as auditors were not public employees but rather independent
contractors whom the mayor could deny auditing contracts in succeeding years

73. See id. at 544.
74. See id, at 545. Fee agents issue motor vehicle licenses and collect motor vehicle sales and use
taxes for the state. See id. at 544 n.3. In determining that fee agents were independent contractors, the
court noted that the state did not supervise the fee agents, did not pay the fee agents, did not hire and
fire the fee agents with respect to individual offices, did not pay the fee agents expenses, required the
fee agents to pay self-employment taxes, and that the fee agents were not part of the state retirement
system. See id. at 545-46.
75. See id. at 545.
76. "Although political patronage comprises a broad range of activities, we are here concerned only
with the constitutionality of dismissing public employees for partisan reasons." Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S.
347, 353 (1976).
77. See Sweeney, 669 F.2d at 545 (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 508 (1980); Elrod, 427
U.S. at 353).
78. See id. at 546. The court argued that fee agents are "selected emissaries of the incumbent
administration and... symbols of the governor's office who do not bring the usual disadvantages of
patronage employees to their posts." Id. (quoting Sweeney v. Bond, 519 F. Supp. 124, 129 (E.D. Mo.
1981) (trial court opinion)). It is difficult to see how political affiliation is any more necessary to the
effective collection of motor vehicle sales and use taxes than it is to the effective performance of the
functions of the process server in Elrod or the assistant public defenders in Brant. The court seems to
have misread the Brantiexception as allowing patronage hiring unless partisan politics would hinder job
performance rather than as allowing patronage hiring only when partisan political affiliation is necessary
to job performance. Cf. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973) (upholding provision in Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1982), prohibiting political activity
by federal employees because such activity is detrimental to the efficient administration of government).
79. 671 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1982).
80. See id. at 304.
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based solely on political affiliations. 8 The court faithfully followed its previous
decision in Sweeney. The court relied completely upon the language used within
Sweeney, and reiterated its refusal to extend the patronage decisions to cases that
did not involve public employees.'
The following year the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
followed suit in refusing to extend the Elrod and Branti protection to independent
contractors. However, the decision in LaFalce v. Houston83 articulated a reason
why the patronage protection decisions should not extend to cases that did not
involve public employees. In LaFalce, an individual proprietor had submitted the
low bid for the installation and maintenance of benches along the streets of
Springfield, Illinois, The City of Springfield nevertheless awarded the contract to
a political supporter of the mayor." Although the court recognized that the practice
of awarding public contracts on political grounds inhibited free expression and
association by contractors, the court declined to extend the scope of Elrod and
Branti to independent contractors. 5
Unlike the courts in Sweeney and Fox & Co., the LaFalce court examined the
competing interests of the City and contractor so it could draw a principled line
between public employees and independent contractors. Recognizing what it thought
was a significant difference in the extent of interference from patronage practices
between public employees and independent contractors, the court concluded that the
degree of coercion exerted on contractors by patronage practices was less than on
public employees.' The court reasoned that "[i]f the contractor does not get the
particular government contract on which he bids ... it is not the end of the world
for him; there are other government entities to bid to, and private ones as well. It
is not like losing your job."' The court tried to discount those contractors who
dealt exclusively with, or devoted a substantial portion of their business to,
government entities by characterizing them as "political hermaphrodites" who
support both parties and thus would not be affected by partisan policies.88

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id. at 305.
See iU
712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983).
See id. at 293.
See id. at 293-94.
See id. at 294.

87. Id. Judge Posner, writing for the court, stated that
many government workers could not find employment at the same wage in the private
sector; and the prospect that a protracted period of search following discharge might well
result in a substrantially less well paid job would cause many government workers to
flinch from taking political stands adverse to their superiors.
Id.; see also Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
First Amendment does not protect contractors in the awarding of public contracts).
88. LaFalce, 712 F.2d at 294. The court reasoned that contractors with extensive independent
contractors support both major parties, not because contracts are issued on a partisan basis, but because
the role of government in American life has made it important to be on good terms with political
groupings in society. See id. This rationale is flawed. If the court is allowing patronage in awarding
contracts in order to advance a party's interest, then contractors supporting both parties cannot be
awarded contracts based on their political affiliation because their loyalties are split. If by choice
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The LaFalce court also attempted to weigh the costs of further subjecting this
country's long-established patronage system to First Amendment scrutiny against the
benefits to an independent contractor's exercise of First Amendment rights.' The
court concluded that the costs of protecting public contracts outweighed the benefits
of protecting independent contractors: "To attempt to purge government of politics
to the extent implied by an effort to banish partisan influences from public
contracting will strike some as idealistic, others as quixotic, still others as
undemocratic, but all as formidable."' Furthermore, the court was reluctant to
extend Elrod and Branti to independent contractors because the United States
Supreme Court seemed to indicate a desire to limit Elrod and Brand to public
employee dismissals.9
In 1986, in Horn v. Kean,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reaffirmed the LaFalce court's position that independent contractors do not
have protection against patronage practices. In Horn, former New Jersey vehicle
agents chosen for their positions by a Democratic governor brought claims for
violations of their constitutional rights when a Republican governor replaced
them." Again the court held that the agents were independent contractors rather
than public employees and thus were not within the First Amendment's protection.'
Despite a more detailed analysis of the historical patronage doctrines and the
reasoning of Elrod and Branti, the Horn court held that Elrod and Brantiexplicitly
encompassed only the dismissal of public employees for partisan reasons and did
not include independent contractors.95 The court did, however, marginally address
the interests of independent contractors and noted that "the respective interests
identified to be weighed by the court in Elrod and Brand are similar to interests
implicated when patronage practices affect independent contractors."' However,

contractors do support both parties, then there is no coercion and no reason for the government to award
contracts to those contractors since they vacillate between two parties and will not effectively aid in the
implementation of party policies.
89. See id.at 293. The court noted that the practice of favoring political supporters in awarding
contracts for public projects has a long history at the federal and particularly state and local levels. See

id.
90. Id. at 294.
91. See id. at 294-95. The court expressed the fear that an extension of Elrod and Branti would
"invite every disappointed bidder for a public contract to bring a federal suit against the government
purchaser." Id. at 294.
92. 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc).
at 669-70.
93. See id.
94. See id.at 669.

95. See id,
at 673-74. The court believed that the teachings of the Elrod and Brand cases did not
encompass all individuals who perform compensated work for a governmental agency. See id. at 674;
see also Lundblad v. Celeste, 874 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding officials are entitled to qualified
immunity from civil damages for First Amendment violations). In Lundblad, the court never reached the
underlying issue of whether it should extend Elrod and Branti to situations involving independent
contractors because no such extension was "clearly established" in 1983 in the Elrodand Branti holdings,
and Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1982), refused to extend First Amendment protection
to independent contractors for politically motivated dismissals. See Lundblad, 874 F.2d at 1102.
96. Horn, 796 F.2d at 674.
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the court supplied its own reasoning as to the vitality of the government interest in
patronage and concluded that the actual balance struck produces a different result.'
Four judges dissented," presenting for the first time a powerful argument why
independent contracts should be protected from patronage dismissal. According to
the dissent, the critical question was not whether there was a factual or economic
difference between public employees and independent contractors but "whether the

state's interests in firing independent contractors because of their political
associations are sufficiently compelling to overcome the contractors' First

Amendment interests. '"" The only compelling interest recognized in Elrod was the
state's interest in plaLcing persons sympathetic to the politics of elected officials into

policymaking positions. m It was far from clear that the state's interest in
patronage would outweigh the independent contractors' interest in freedom of belief
and association.' The power exerted over an individual's political beliefs, if the
government controlled a substantial portion of that individual's income, could be as
effective as when the government had control over one-hundred percent of that

individual's income."

Finally, the dissent noted that a rule holding that the

Supreme Court's patronage decisions do not protect independent contractors
essentially allows the states to free themselves of the limitations of the First

Amendment by simply contracting out functions previously performed by state
employees."0
I1. O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake and Board of County
Commissioners v. Umbehr
The O'Hare and Umbehr decisions, addressing patronage and free speech

respectively, were argued separately, but the United States Supreme Court decided
them on the same day. The minority, realizing the distinction between government

97. See id The court again addressed the assumed understanding that partisan politics lies at the core
of our democratic process and that it is necessary for the effective implementation of the administration's
programs. See id However, the court conceded that "the politically-based interests sought to be advanced
by patronage practices am similar whether public employees or contractors are involved," but decided that
"the countervailing First Amendment interests differ." Id This court deemed this distinction important
because the central concern of the Court in Elrod and Branti - that patronage coerces public employees
into adopting a new belief or dissociating themselves from a particular belief - has diminished importance
when the recipient is a contractor with the state rather than a state employee. See id. The court relied on
LaFalce to support this alleged distinction. See idL at 674-75.
98. Circuit Judge Gibbons presented the dissenting opinion with whom Judges Sloviter, Mansmann,
dissenting).
and Stapleton joined. See id at 680-85 (Gibbons, J.,
99. Id at 683 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
dissenting).
100. See id. at 682 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
101. See id. at 682-83 (Gibbons, J.,
102. See id.at 683 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
103. See id at 680 (Gibbons, J.,dissenting). Writing for the dissenters, Judge Gibbons also
expressed his disbelief that the Founding Fathers would have allowed one party to use the economic
power of the state to prevent other groups from competing effectively to replace them. See id. at 684-85
(Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
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employees and public contractors was eroding, attached the same dissenting opinion
to O'Hare and Umbehr.'°'
A. O'Hare
1. Facts
The City of Northlake (City) coordinated a towing service through the police
department and maintained a rotation list of available towing companies. When the
police department received a towing request, it would call the next towing company
on the list. The City's policy had been to remove a tow truck operator from the
rotation list only for cause. O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. (O'Hare) had been on the
list since 1965. O'Hare and the City's former mayor had a mutual understanding that
the City would maintain O'Hare's place on the rotation list so long as O'Hare
provided good service.
In 1989, soon after being elected the City's new mayor, Reid Paxon told Mr.
Gratzianna, the owner of O'Hare, that he was pleased with O'Hare's work and would
continue using its services. Four years later, when Mr. Paxon was running for
reelection, his campaign committee asked Gratzianna f6r a contribution. Gtatzianna
refused to contribute and instead supported Paxon's opponent. Shortly thereafter,
O'Hare was removed from the rotation list.
O'Hare and Gratzianna filed suit in the United States District Court of the
Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging their removal from
the rotation list was in retaliation for Gratzianna's stance in the campaign. The
District Court dismissed the complaint."° The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed, adhering to the view that "it should be up to the
United States Supreme Court to extend Elrod."'" The United States Supreme
Court, to resolve the conflict between Courts of Appeal regarding the applicability
of Elrod and Brand to independent contractors, granted certiorari on March 20,
1996.'"
2. Holding
The issue presented to the United States Supreme Court was whether the
protections of Elrod and Branti extend to an independent contractor who, in
retaliation for refusing to comply with demands for political support, has a
government contract terminated or is removed from an official list of contractors
authorized to perform public services."° The Court, in a seven-to-two vote, held
that the protections of Elrod and Brand extend to an instance where the government

104. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 16 S. Ct. 2342, 2361 (1996) (containing Justice
Scalia's dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, to both Umbehr and O'Hare).
105. See O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 843 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D. Iil. 1994).
106. See O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 47 F.3d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1995).
107. See O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2356 (1996).
108. See id. at 2355.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:557

retaliates against a contractor, or a regular service provider, for exercising rights of
political association or expression of political allegiance." °
B. Umbehr
1. Facts
In 1981, and after a renegotiation in 1985, Wabaunsee County, Kansas (the
County) contracted Keen A. Umbehr to be the exclusive hauler of trash for cities
in the county. The County was to automatically renew the contract between Umbehr
and the County unless either party terminated it by giving at least sixty-days notice
before the end of the year, or unless either party instituted a renegotiation on ninetydays notice. Umbehr hauled trash from 1985 to 1991 on an exclusive and
uninterrupted basis.
During the term cf his contract, Umbehr was an outspoken critic of the Board of
County Commissioners of Wabaunsee County (the Board). Umbehr spoke at the
Board meetings and wrote critical letters and editorials in local newspapers about
the County's landfill user rates and alleged mismanagement of taxpayer money.
Umbehr also ran for election to the Board. The Board members allegedly took
offense to Umbehr's words, threatening to censor the county newspaper for
publishing his writings. In 1991, after a similar attempt in 1990,"'0 the Board
terminated Umbehr's contract by a vote of two-to-one.
In 1992, Umbehr brought suit against the two majority Board members in their
individual"' and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they had
terminated his government contract in retaliation for his criticism of the County and
the Board. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas held that "the
First Amendment does not prohibit .[the Board] from considering [Umbehr's]
expression as a factor in deciding not to continue with the trash hauling contract at
the end of the contract's annual term""' because as an independent contractor, the
First Amendment did not entitle Umbehr to the same protections afforded to public
employees."' The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,
holding that
an independent contractor is protected under the First Amendment from
retaliatory governmental action, just as an employee would be, and that
the extent of protection is to be determined by weighing the

109. See id. at 2359.
110. In 1990, the Board voted 2-1 to terminate, or at least prevent the automatic renewal of, Mr.
Umbehr's contract with the County. The attempt failed because of a technical defect. See Board of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2343, 2345 (1996).
111. The district court held that the claims against the Board members in their individual capacities
were barred by qualified immunity, see Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F. Supp. 837, 841 (D.Kan. 1993), and
this ruling was affirmed on appeal, see Umbehr v. McClure, 44 F.3d 876, 883 (10th Cir. 1995). The
Board members who were the original defendants eventually resigned their positions, so in the Supreme
Court, the Board was substituted for them as petitioner.
112. Umbehr, 840 F. Supp. at 839.
113. See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2346 (citing Umbehr, 840 F. Supp. at 839).
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government's interests as contractor against the free speech interests at
stake in accordance with the balancing test that we used to determine
a government employee's First Amendment rights in [Pickeringv. Board
of Education].114
Therefore, the court remanded the official capacity claims to the district court for
further proceedings, including consideration of whether the termination was
retaliatory. The United States Supreme Court, to resolve a conflict between the
United States Courts of Appeals about whether, and to what extent, the First
Amendment protects independent contractors,'1 5 granted certiorari on November
28, 1995.116
2. Holding
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether, and to what extent, the
First Amendment protects independent contractors from the termination of at-will
government contracts in retaliation for their exercise of freedom of speech."7 The
Court, by a vote of seven-to-two, held that the First Amendment protects
independent contractors from the termination or prevention of automatic renewal of
at-will government contracts in retaliation for their exercise of the freedom of
speech."' The Court also held that the Pickering balancing test, adjusted to weigh
the government's interests as contractor rather than as employer, determines the
extent of protection."9
C. Decisions
1. O'Hare- The Kennedy Majority
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion for the majority,"2 began his analysis
with a history of the Court's rejection of the proposition that a public employee has
no right to a government job and so cannot complain that termination violates First
Amendment rights. Absent some reasonably appropriate requirement, Kennedy
argued, the government may not make public employment contingent upon political
beliefs or prescribed expression.'
In introducing the Court's opinion, Justice Kennedy presented a comparison
between Gratzianna and a public employee. If Gratzianna was a public employee
whose job was to perform tow truck operations, he argued, there is no doubt that
the City could not discharge him for refusing to contribute to the mayor's campaign

114. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2346 (quoting Umbehr, 44 F.3d at 883).

115. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits agreed with the Tenth Circuit while the Third and Seventh

Circuits did not. See id.
116. See idL at 2346.
117. See id. at 2345.
118. See id. at2346.

119. See id.
120. Voting for the majority were Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer and Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion which Justice Thomas joined.
121. See O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2357 (1996).
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or for supporting hi; opponent." Thus, according to Kennedy, the Court could not
distinguish between the actions of the City in this case and the coercion exercised
in other unconstitutional condition cases.'" In fact, had the mayor or his backers

asked for the contribution as a quid pro quo for continuing O'Hare's arrangement

with the City, they might well have violated bribery statutes.U
Justice Kennedy then addressed the City's arguments. The City tried to
distinguish this case on the basis that it involved a claim by an independent
contractor. While acknowledging this fact, Kennedy could still see no reason for the

constitutional claim of an independent contractor to turn on that distinction.
Kennedy argued thr.t to recognize such a distinction would invite manipulation by

government, which could avoid constitutional liability simply by attaching different
labels to particular jobs.'"

In reaching his conclusion, Justice Kennedy referred to the Court's decision in
Lejkowitz v. Turley.,' where the court did not "see a difference of constitutional
magnitude between the threat of job loss to an employee of the State, and a threat

of loss of contracts to a contractor."'" It was this "difference of constitutional
magnitude," in the degree to which employees and contractors depend on

government sources for their income, which Kennedy concluded the City did not
show." However, it was not on this distinction that Justice Kennedy wanted to
rest. He recognized that courts are not well suited to the task of measuring levels

of employee dependence.'"

The fundamental concern was that independent

contractors, as well as public employees, should have the right to protest wrongful
government interference with their rights of speech and association.' °
Finally, Justice Kennedy emphasized the rights of governmental entities in

making contracting decisions. 3 ' If the government terminates a provider for

122. See id. at 2358.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 2358-59.
125. See id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2349 (1996)).
126. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
127. See O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2359 (citing LeJkowitz, 414 U.S. at 83).
128. See O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2359.
129. See id. at 2360.
130. See i.
131. Justice Kennedy noted that the Constitution accords government officials a large measure of
freedom:
Interests of economy may lead a governmental entity to retain existing contractors or
terminate them Li favor of new ones without the costs and complexities of competitive
bidding. A government official might offer a satisfactory justification, unrelated to the
suppression of speech or associational rights, for either course of action. The first may
allow the government to maintain stability, reward good performance, deal with known
and reliable persons, or ensure the uninterrupted supply of goods or services; the second
may help to stimulate competition, encourage experimentation with new contractors, or
avoid the appearance of favoritism. These are choices and policy considerations that ought
to remain open to government officials when deciding to contract with some firms and
not others, provided of course the asserted justifications are not the pretext for some
improper practio.
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reasons unrelated to political association, for example, the provider is unreliable or
if political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of
the task,' no First Amendment violation exists.'
Concluding that the city failed to show that the absolute right to enforce a
patronage scheme was a necessary part of a legitimate political system in all
instances, Kennedy chose to continue following the decisions in Elrod and
Branti." Therefore, Justice Kennedy refused to draw, and some may argue erased,
a line excluding independent contractors from First Amendment protection.
2. Umbehr - The O'ConnorMajority
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority," first determined that the similarities
between government employees and government contractors were obvious. 3 ' She
then looked to government employment precedents for guidance.'37 Relying on
proper application of the Pickering balancing test, O'Connor concluded that the
Court could apply government employee cases to independent contractors.'
Both Umbehr and the Board argued. that independent contractors worked at a
greater remove from government officials than do most government employees.'39
The Board further argued that the lack of day-to-day control accentuated the
government's need to have work done by someone it trusted'" and that the cost
of fending off litigation outweighs the interest of independent contractors, who are
typically less financially dependent on their government contracts than are
employees." By contrast, Umbehr argued that the government's interest in
maintaining harmonious working environments and relationships recognized in
government employee cases are attenuated where the contractor does not work at
the government's workplace and does not interact daily with government officers
and employees.' 42 Umbehr also pointed out that where the public perceives him
as an independent contractor, any government concern that his political statements
will be confused with the government's political positions is mitigated.'43
Although Justice O'Connor recognized the merits of both arguments, she still
believed the Pickering balancing test could accommodate the differences between

Id.
132. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
133. See O'Hare, 116 S. CL at 2361.
134. See id. at 2361.
135. Concurring with the majority opinion, Parts I, 11-A, II-B-2 and III, were Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, and with respect to Part H-B-1, were
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Thomas joined.
136. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2346-47 (1996).

137. See id at 2347.
138. See id. at 2348.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See
See
See
See
See

id
id.
id
id.
id
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public employees and independent contractors.'" The bright line rule'45 proposed
by the Board would give the government carte blanche to terminate independent
contractors for exercising First Amendment rights and leave First Amendment rights
unduly dependent on whether state law labels a government service provider's
contract as a contract of employment or a contract for services." Thus, Justice

O'Connor concluded that independent contractors do enjoy limited First Amendment

protection. 47 The Court's decision, however, is limited to a preexisting commercial

relationship with the government and therefore does not address the possibility of
suits by bidders or applicants for new government contracts. 4
3. Umbehr and O'Hare-

The Dissenting Partnershipof Scalia and Thomas

Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion'49 began by rebuking the Court for being
"fickle" in its convictions.'- Justice Scalia argued that refusing to reward one's
opponents is an American political tradition as old as the Republic' and questioned each Justice's ability and right to change tradition.' Justice Scalia then

concluded by quoting from Justice Holmes in a case challenging the constitutionality
of a federal estate tax:
[The] matter. . . is disposed of ....not by an attempt to make some
scientific distinction, which would be at least difficult, but on an
interpretation of language by its traditional use - on the practical and
historical ground that this kind of tax always has been regarded as the
antithesis of a direct tax ...Upon this point a page of history is worth
a volume of logic.'

144. See id. at 2349.
145. A bright line rule would be one that distinguished independent contractors from public
employees. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 2352.
148. See id.
149. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. See Board of County Comm'rs, Wabuansee County, Kan.
v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2361 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
Dissenting).
150. See id. at 2362 (Scalia, J.,dissenting). With some sarcasm, Justice Scalia said "today's
decisions . . . demonstrate why this Court's Constitution-making process can be called 'reasoned
adjudication' only in the most formalistic sense." Id at 2361-62 (Sealia, J., dissenting). In his frustration,
is profoundly disturbing that the varying political practices across this vast
he then went on to say "[ilt
country, from coast to coast, can be transformed overnight by an institution whose conviction of what
dissenting). Besides rebuking the Court for
the Constitution means is so fickle." Id. at 2362 (Scalia, J.,
its "fickleness," Justice Scalia also warned the Court was now on the "slippery slope" where "one logical
proposition detached from history leads to another, until the Court produces a result that bears no
resemblance to the America that we know." Id. at 2366 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 2362 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 2363 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The question he presents is one commentators, judges,
and Constitutional Law classes have debated and will continue debating - "What secret knowledge, one
must wonder, is breathed into lawyers when they become Justices of this Court, that enables them to
discern that a practice which the text of the Constitution does not clearly proscribe, and which our people
dissenting).
have regardedas constiwtional for 200 years, is in fact unconstitutional?" Id. (Scalia, J.,
153. Id. at 2363-64 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,
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After arguing in favor of tradition, Justice Scalia focused on government
contracting itself. Citing examples of federal, state, and local regulations, he noted
that these regulations were the way the government regulates their contracts and the
way the government addressed public policy problems.'" However, these
regulations have brought with them a degree of discrimination, discernment, and
predictability that a constitutional prohibition cannot achieve.' Justice Scalia also
argued that the government favors, or disfavors, those who agree with its political
view everyday when it decides where to build public works, on whom to impose
taxes, and on whom to grant benefits.'"
Justice Scalia then highlighted the differences between public employees and
independent contractors. Relying on Judge Posner's distinction in LaFalce," he
argued that a public employee is virtually always one who is not rich, and the loss
of his job would deny him his livelihood.' On the other hand, an independent
contractor is usually a corporation, and a loss of a contract rarely kills an entire
business.'59
After focusing on the differences between independent contractors and public
employees, Justice Scalia concentrated on the potential for additional litigation."
Deciding that today's decision created just another "case-by-case, balance-all-thefactors-and-who-knows-who-will-win" situation,'"' he concluded that such
uncertainty would breed litigation. Justice Scalia focused on the merits of the
existing government contracting laws. Scalia found the contracting laws were clear
and detailed, and it was easy to ascertain when a party had violated them."
Conversely, the extension of First Amendment protection to independent contractors
now requires a sensitive "balancing" which will place all government entities at risk
of § 1983 lawsuits unless they implement procedures which make it easy to defend
against a claim of political favoritism."
Justice Scalia then attacked the decision itself. "What the Court sets down in
Umbehr," Justice Scalia argued, "it rips up in O'Hare." Scalia cited the general
principles which divide the freedom of speech into two categories: (1) the right of
free speech to which the Pickeringbalancing test applies; and (2) political affiliation
to which the rules in Elrod and Branti apply." Realizing that both types of
M

349 (1921)).
154. See id. at 2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
156. See id. at 2366 (Scalia, J.,
157. See id. at 2366-67 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292,294 (7th
Cir. 1983)).
dissenting).
158. See id. at 2366 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
159. See id. (Scalia, J.,
160. See id. at 2367 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
dissenting).
161. Id. at 2374 (Scalia, J.,

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

dissenting).
See id. at 2367 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
at 2368 (Scalia, J.,
See id.
dissenting).
See id. at 2367 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 2370 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
See id. (Scalia, J.,
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speech could occur in the same situation, Justice Scalia argued that the United
States Courts of Appeals will face uncertainty in deciding which test to apply.67
Concluding his opinion, Justice Scalia referred to hard cases making bad law."~
In fact, Scalia argued, "[t]he cases before the Court today set the blood boiling, with
the arrogance that th.y seem to display on the part of elected officials."'" Finally,
warned Scalia, "[w]hile the present Court sits, a major, undemocratic restructuring
of our national institutions and mores is constantly in progress.' 7
IV. Analysis of Umbehr and O'Hare Opinions
A. Majority
After refusing to recognize the similarities between public employees and
independent contractors for over twenty years, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were
correct in returning ta the public employee cases for guidance when the Court did
decide to extend protection to independent contractors. One question that remains,
however, is why did it take so long?
The majority recognized and argued that patronage-based contracting coerces
beliefs and unconstitutionally infringes upon individual rights protected by the First
Amendment. Limiting the availability of public contracts by conditioning contracts
on partisan affiliation hinders free belief and association. Consequently, the loss or
rejection of a public contract for failing to compromise one's convictions creates a
constitutional claim. Conversely, if independent contractors want public contracts,
some will suppress their free speech and associational rights to obtain and establish
such contracts. Both situations, while requiring one to make a choice, result in
oppression of constitational liberties and are therefore not choices at all.
B. Minority
Justice Scalia obviously supported 'the practice of patronage, whether in the
context of public employees or independent contractors. Based primarily on the age
of the institution of patronage, Justice Scalia argued that the Court should allow
patronage hiring because it has been an accepted practice for such a long time.
Scalia based this argument on the belief that the Court should not read into the
Constitution any rights which it did not clearly contain at the time of its drafting.
The United States Supreme Court, prior to these decisions, has occasionally
sustained practices, otherwise suspect under the First Amendment, where there has
been a long history of allowing the practice.'7' A court is therefore likely to
exercise caution before declaring an institution unlawful when the court, for nearly
200 years, believed the institution was constitutional."u Until recently, it was
167. See id. at 2371 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 2373 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (upholding recitation by chaplain of
daily prayer in opening proceedings in state legislature); cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957) (holding that obscenity is not protected expression under the First Amendment).
172. The plurality in Elrod did not really give this justification serious consideration, and indeed
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believed that because government could withhold benefits, it could also attach
strings to those benefits it decided to distribute. This doctrine was based on the idea
that government benefits are privileges and not rights. Today, however, the doctrine
is based on the idea that the government cannot do indirectly what it cannot directly
do. Patronage contracting, by requiring political support as a condition for obtaining
a contract, imposes an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of First
Amendment rights, thereby making patronage unconstitutional.
Indeed, patronage contracting has a storied past that had its time and its place in
the halls of tradition where Justice Scalia roams, but circumstances have changed.
Government has grown at all levels. The demand made by government on labor and
services from the private sector was once relatively minor, but the government is
now a major consumer of both. This shift in significance of government as
employer and consumer makes reliance on the history of patronage contracting
unsound."
Justice Scalia's best argument may have been regarding litigation. Raising every
adverse government employment decision to the level of a constitutional issue will
result in a potential rise in litigation. The results of twenty years of patronage
employment decisions have varied and made it difficult for government employers
to be certain their employment actions are constitutional. Now those same
difficulties extend to government contracts as well.
The effect of this unpredictability means that the fear of litigation and uncertainty
over the results of judicial review may cause government officials to award
contracts based on price alone, resulting in contracts with inadequate and
incompetent contractors. Such acts would not serve the public interest and may even
harm it. If employers do not always award the contract to the lowest bidder, the
lowest bidder may sue and subject the employers who properly exercised their
powers of discretion to unfavorable publicity. The government would spend more
tax dollars to defend itself in cases that may not really be about First Amendment
rights at all but about struggles over and between political adversaries. Therefore,
Justice Scalia's desire to maintain the status quo still has some merit.
V. Ramifications of Umbehr and O'Hare
The effect that Umbehr and O'Hare will have on public contracts is uncertain.
Undoubtedly, courts will continue to struggle in applying the public employee
decisions to independent contractors. The obvious effect of Umbehr and O'Hare
will be to quell commentator opinions that the Court should extend First
Amendment protection for public employees to independent contractors. Many

viewed the tainted history of the practice negatively, see Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 353-55 (1976),
though it did not place history on the constitutional scales against the practice, see id. at 354.
173. As Justice Stevens pointed out in the first court of appeals decision to hold patronage
dismissals unconstitutional, "if the age of a pernicious practice were a sufficient reason for its continued
acceptance, the constitutional attack on racial discrimination would, of course, have been.doomed to
failure." Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 568 n.14 (7th Cir. 1972), quoted in
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 369 n.22 (1976).
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courts will question whether First Amendment protection extends to all independent
contractors or only those whom the government terminated from an existing
contract.
A. Governmental Benefits
Obviously, the Scalia dissent supports patronage practices and, if possible, would
overrule the public employee and independent contractor patronage protection cases.
The majority, however, recognizes that patronage conditions or penalizes the receipt
of a government benefit at the cost of individual rights. Allowing independent
contractors to keep their jobs if they provide support for a favored political party
effectively produces a result that the government could not directly command. This
implicates independent contractor's individual rights by forcing them to suppress or
give up their speech and associational beliefs to receive a public contract.
The decisions of O'Hare and Umbehr have removed the ability of government
officials to purchase power at the cost of First Amendment rights. The government
can no longer condition valuable benefits on the relinquishing of constitutional
rights or deny benefits to a person on a basis that infringes upon an individual's
constitutionally protected interests.
B. Governmental Interests
Although the government can no longer purchase power at the cost of First
Amendment rights, proof of a compelling state interest may still override the rights
of independent contractors. The only governmental interest ever mentioned is in
political patronage itself and it is "an interest that has never been recognized in a
First Amendment context by a majority of the Supreme Court."' 4 The majority in
O'Hare and Umbehr makes it clear that the government's interest in patronage no
longer takes on greater weight in the independent contractor context. Consequently,
the Court now affords public employees and independent contractors equal First
Amendment rights.
Placing public employees and independent contractors on equal footing may hurt
independent contractors. Like the public employee patronage decisions that
inadvertently hurt public employees by encouraging the government to contract out
governmental functions to those with less First Amendment protection, the O'Hare
and Umbehr decisions may also inadvertently hurt independent contractors by
limiting the number of contracts into which the government is willing to enter. Any
decision to keep a project in-house adversely affects independent contractors
because it is one less project available to them. If the government sees an efficiency
or economic benefit to keeping a project in-house, the decision to keep the project

174. Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 683 (3d Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting). In discounting the
majority's opinion in Horn, the dissenters note that even in identifying this interest (efficiency and
economy), the majority eoes not engage in the necessary comparison between the state's interests in
patronage and the indep.-ndent contractors' interests in freedom of belief and association. See id.
(Gibbons, J.,dissenting). The dissent noted that the Horn majority, without analysis, assumed that
independent contractors lack any serious interests that need to be insulated form patronage. See id.
(Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
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in-house is easier to make because public employees and independent contractors
now have similar First Amendment protections. Both efficiency and economic
benefit are vital governmental interests.
The only governmental interest sufficient to justify a limitation on First
Amendment rights in public employee cases is the government's interest in having
policymaking positions occupied by persons aligned with the administration's
policies.17 The Court has never deemed such party affiliation crucial to public
contracts. Although hiring politically affiliated contractors may be an effective way
to carry out the administration's program, the work of the government should not
be a conduit through which political factions gain and wield economic power.'76
Both O'Hare and Umbehr make it clear that unless an independent contractor's
political affiliation clearly indicates it will compromise the government's ability to
discharge its responsibilities, the court should prohibit the government from
disabling aspects of a contractor's political commitment that lie at the core of
citizenship.
C. PatronageHiring
The decisions in OHare and Umbehr may have removed the government's ability
to terminate independent contractors for exercising First Amendment freedoms, but
they did not restrict patronage hiring of independent contractors. Responding to the
American people's decision that political influence in government contracting is not
desirable, all fifty states have created some kind of lowest responsible bidder
statute.'" These statutes are the way the government limits its contracting
decisions, but these statutes do allow for some favoritism and discrimination. How
long will the Court allow this favoritism in hiring to continue? The result in the
example of Peter public employee and Ira independent contractor has changed in the
context of termination, but if the example were a hiring situation, Ira would still
have no recourse. It is probably just a matter of time before the Supreme Court
grants certiorari to address the issue of patronage hiring. Until that time, however,
there will exist a distinction between public employees and independent contractors.
D. Floodgates of Litigation
As a result of the Umbehr and O'Hare decisions, and as the Scalia dissent
posited, there may be a rise in litigation. Indeed, this could occur because Umbehr
and O'Hare have effectively expanded the pool of potential plaintiffs. However,
potential plaintiffs and their attorneys still face two substantial legal hurdles in any
suit alleging any First Amendment right restrictions: (1) establishing standing to sue
and (2) meeting the burden of proof.
Since the Elrod decision, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the standing
requirement has become increasingly restrictive. A plaintiff must show both that the
injury suffered is fairly traceable to, or caused by, the defendant's action and that

175. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 366 (1976).
176. See Horn, 796 R2d at 685 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
177. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2364 n.1 (1996).
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the action of the court is likely to redress the injury.'78 These requirements should
tend to cut down the number of suits brought to challenge individual employment
decisions because the potential plaintiff would need to show not only that they had
applied for the job and did not get it but also that they were among the smaller
number of candidates who were under consideration for the position. Only by
showing these things could a plaintiff reasonably argue that the court's decision
would in fact result in relief.
The second hurdle facing plaintiffs bringing political discrimination suits is an
extremely difficult burden of proof. A plaintiff must show that constitutionally
protected conduct - freedom of expression and association in patronage cases was a substantial motivating factor in the employer's decision.'" The government
may then establish as a defense that it would have made the same decision even
absent the protected conduct."w Assuming competent counsel represents both
parties, these heavy burdens on any potential plaintiff will reduce the number of
cases brought before the Court.
E. Application of Elrod and Pickering
Another issue raised by the O'Hare and Umbehr decisions is which test,
Pickering or Elrod, applies when the government terminates an independent
contractor for exercising her freedom of political association and speech rights. The
Court has advised which test applies when only one right is offended: Pickering
applies to free speech cases and Elrod applies to political affiliation cases."' This
is consistent with de,:isions affecting public employees. However, the existence of
two separate doctrines for similar situations will likely continue to confound lower
courts.
In the past, courts have differed on how to approach cases where both free speech
and political affiliation may have played a role in the decision to terminate.'
Which test applied depended on the court's view of the relationship between the two
lines of Supreme Court precedent. The two lines of cases share similar
constitutional concerns and similar interests of the parties. Accordingly, several
courts have concluded that the patronage cases are a narrow subset of the Pickering
cases." In contrast, other courts viewed Pickering and Elrod as governing entirely
separate situations which has caused a great deal of confusion.lu Lower courts
now hearing independent contractor cases may merge the patronage cases with
employee speech cases and apply the Pickeringor Elrodanalysis in situations where

178. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 739, 751-53 (1984).
179. See Mt. Health School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977).

180. Id at 287.
181. See OHare, 116 S. Ct at 2349.
182. Compare Heath v. Highland Park Sch. Dist., 800 F. Supp. 1470 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (political
disagreements between president and board do not fall within conduct protected under the First
Amendment) with Armstrong v. City of Arnett, 708 F. Supp. 320 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (discharge was not

a violation of Frst Amendment rights).
183. See, e.g., McBee- v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009, 1014 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
184. See, e.g., Barnes v. Bosley, 745 F.2d 501, 506 (8th cir. 1984).
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it is inappropriate. O'Hare and Umbehr have still left unanswered the questions
about treatment of independent contractors, or public employees, who offend the
government by both speech and political affiliation. Until such a plaintiff stands
before the Supreme Court, lower courts will have a lot of discretion in deciding
which line of cases to apply.
F. Governmental Decision Making
The final problem emerging from the O'Hare and Umbehr decisions is what
consequences attempts to enforce the extension of First Amendment rights will have
on governmental decision making. Governmental hiring decisions involving
nonpolicymaking public employees are not as complex as governmental contracting
decisions for two reasons. First, the going wage for a government employee is
usually fixed, and therefore the employee's "price" is not a criterion for deciding
whom to employ. Second, the qualifications for employment are usually clear from
the nature of the job and its history.
The result is that nonpolitical reasons for an adverse employment decision, such
as lack of education, misconduct, or poor performance, can easily be documented
to justify the decision. Similarly, the employer can easily prove the absence of such
factors, so that where insufficient nonpolitical justification exists, a cause of action
under Elrod is easily made out. Therefore, government officials are put on notice
as to the limits of their discretion with respect to employment decisions. Moreover,
given the expense and difficulty of proving a claim under Elrod when nonpolitical
factors do form the basis of an employment decision, individuals are unlikely to
bring suit unless they can make a clear case.
The situation is both more complex and less certain from the government's
viewpoint in the contracting context. When two or more prospective contractors are
bidding for government contractors, price is almost always a factor. Other factors,
such as past performance, experience, and unique capabilities, are also sure to be
important, while the uniqueness of the task may make the optimal qualifications for
the job uncertain and unquantifiable. The preponderance of these complex,
unquantifiable factors in contracting decisions, makes it more difficult for a court
to isolate and detect improper grounds for awarding contracts than for making
employment decisions.
The effect of this higher level of uncertainty in the contracting context is twofold.
First, the fear of frivolous litigation and uncertainty over the results of judicial
review of contracting decisions may lead government officials to feel themselves
constrained to award all contracts based on price alone. Such awards may often be
at the cost of inadequate contract performance by inexperienced or otherwise
incompetent contractors. Having less capable, though cheaper, contractors perform
government contracts would inevitably harm the public interest. The alternative,
equally detrimental to the public interest, might be to have every award to a
contractor, other than the lowest bidder, litigated in a federal court. Increased
litigation could adversely affect the contractor's interest if it makes the contract
awarding process more expensive. Government entities may decide that the
competitive bidding process is simply too time-consuming and complicated. They
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may therefore choose instead to negotiate only with a single contractor they believe
to be most likely suited for the job. Alternatively, government purchasers may feel
constrained to bid out even those contracts now awarded through individual
negotiations. This system at least has the advantage of reducing the number of
potential litigants contesting the award to one - the lowest bidder - rather than
all contractors who might claim they would have been chosen but fo political
considerations.
The second, somewhat ironic, consequence of the uncertainty inherent in
enforcing the rule of Elrod may be to dissuade contractors from making political
contributions. Either because of the warning effect on government officials or
because the existence of prior political contributions could form the basis of suits
by competitors to have their contract awards rescinded, contractors might
legitimately fear that prior political contributions could cause them to lose
contracts." To avoid such losses, many contractors might feel compelled to
withhold support that they would otherwise choose to provide from a political party.
Hence, extending Efrod may actually result in an inadvertent suppression of speech.
While these possibilities do exist, they do not justify completely denying
independent contractors any protection against the infringement of their First
Amendment rights. Though refusing to recognize a cause of action altogether would
alleviate the problem, such a solution is grossly overinclusive. To completely deny
the existence of First Amendment rights would be a simplistic way of avoiding
problems associated with its enforcement. As with other causes of action posing
similar drawbacks, a careful delineation of the elements of the cause of action and
a judicious allocation of burdens of proof and persuasion, considering the
government official's need for certainty and discretion and the plaintiffs need for
a remedy can accommodate any competing First Amendment concerns.
VI. Conclusion
No compelling governmental interest outweighs the First Amendment rights of
independent contractors. Extension of the prohibition of patronage to independent
contractors follows the same rules and exceptions of Elrod, Branti, or Pickering.
The only grounds on which the government may not terminate the contract are those
which the First Amendment protects.
For the Court to have ruled any differently would have been to contradict recent
First Amendment jurisprudence, which particularly condemns all forms of
viewpoint-based suppression of speech" and contribution.'" By contrast,

185. Cf.Shakman v. Democratic Org., 435 F.2d 267,269 (7th Cir. 1970) (voters and candidates who
allege that the city's patronage employment system denied them an equal opportunity in elections state
a cause of action under tle equal protection clause). In Shakman, the court warned the district court that,
in fashioning a remedy on remand, "care will be required in order to distinguish between compelled and
voluntary political support by public employees," since, in the absence of a statute prohibiting such
conduct, "such individuals enjoy the same right of political association and expression, on their own time,
as anyone else." Id. at 271.
186. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1995); RA.V. v. City of
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punishing contractors who derive income from work performed for the government
because they have supported a political opponent of the persons in power
unconstitutionally chills the exercise of associational and speech rights that are at
the heart of the First Amendment.
Brent C. Eckersley

St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
187. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 234-35 (1977).
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